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Abstract
In the Austrian (as well as the German) education system students have
to choose between dierent school tracks at the age of 10. We argue that
early tracking creates ineciencies because the earlier the track choice has to
be made, the more it is inuenced by factors other than innate ability. Recent
evidence suggests that the relative age of a student within a grade is related
to his or her achievement, and that this eect is decreasing over grades. Thus,
age-related achievement dierences probably translate into age-related dier-
ences in track choice if track choice has to be made early. In this paper we
estimate the eect of observed age on the track choice after grade 4 using
register data for a major Austrian city for the period 1984-2006. Since ob-
served age at track choice is endogenous, we exploit the exogenous variation
in birth month to identify the causal eect of age. We nd a strong and sig-
nicant positive eect of age on track choice in grades 5{8. Since after grade
8, students again have to make a track choice, we use additional data from
PISA 2003 and 2006 to show that the eect is long-lasting in urban areas.
Therefore, the education system fails to provide a mechanism that leads to an
ecient allocation of students to tracks.
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Although all European countries allocate their students to dierent educational
tracks at some stage of secondary education, in some countries, the decision about
which track to attend has to be made at a relatively early stage of the education
process, e.g. at the age of 10 in Austria and Germany.1 In recent work, economists
have shown that early tracking reinforces the role of parental background, thereby
limiting intergenerational mobility in educational attainment and income (e.g. Am-
merm uller, 2005; Bauer and Riphahn, 2006; Brunello and Checchi, 2007; Pekkarinen
et al., 2009b). For Germany, Dustmann (2004) provides evidence that secondary
school track choice is heavily inuenced by parental background and has lasting
eects on further educational achievement and entry wages. Using a dierence-in-
dierence approach, Hanushek and W omann (2006) show that countries that track
their students before the age of 15 exhibit higher educational inequality and tend to
have lower mean achievement.2
Apart from concerns about equality of opportunities, economists have stressed the
eects of tracking on overall eciency. Proponents of educational tracking empha-
size that all students benet from homogenous classrooms, which result from the
placement of students into diering-ability schools or classes. They argue that het-
erogenous classrooms harm gifted students and less talented students alike because
teachers may either divide attention among both groups or may adjust teaching to
the prociency level of the median ability student. In such a situation gifted students
are not able to unfold their potential while less talented students get discouraged,
resulting in lower aggregate achievement. In contrast, tracking may induce a teacher
eect, i.e. teachers are more eective in teaching homogenous classes.
Exploiting a randomized experiment in Kenya, Duo et al. (2008) provide evidence
that tracking primary school students by prior achievement increased test scores
of students in high-achievement and low-achievement classes because homogenous
classrooms allowed teachers to focus their teaching. However, the authors admit
that these results may only be obtained in developing countries, where students
are very heterogenous and classes are large. In contrast, developed countries are
characterized by smaller classes, lower achievement dierences and a higher level
of resources. Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2004) analyze the gradual abolition of
1Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Turkey track at the age of 11, Belgium and Nether-
lands at the age of 12 and Luxembourg at the age of 13. All other European countries track their
students at the age of 14 to 16 (Brunello and Checchi, 2007).
2Pischke and Manning (2006) show that a dierence-in-dierence approach is not able to elimi-
nate the selection bias between students attending comprehensive and selective schools in England
and Wales.
1selective grammar schools in the UK. Using political aliation of the county as an
instrument of comprehensive school attendance they nd some evidence that high
ability students do worse under the comprehensive schooling system and low/middle
ability students were not hurt by ability tracking. However, their estimates are
imprecise, and Pischke and Manning (2006) show that their identication strategy
is not able to remove the selection bias. As far as we know, there is no other direct
evidence for eciency gains through early tracking in developed countries.
On the contrary there are studies showing that early tracking is inecient. Meghir
and Palme (1995) nd that the introduction of compulsory comprehensive schooling
in Sweden induced on average an increase in schooling beyond the compulsory level
and an increase in earnings for students with unskilled fathers. The mean eect on
earnings for all students is positive but not signicant. In a recent study, Pekkarinen
et al. (2009a) investigate the impact of the Finnish comprehensive school reform
in the 1970s on cognitive skills. The authors nd small positive eects on mean
achievement in verbal tests as well as positive eects in math for students with low
parental education.
The literature on peer eects gives indirect evidence on the optimal allocation
of students. If peer eects are non-linear, such that weak students benet from
high-ability students whereas the latter are less or not aected by less favorable
peers, heterogenous classrooms should be more ecient as they lead to higher ag-
gregate achievement. In contrast, if high-ability students are more sensitive to peers,
aggregate achievement is maximized when classrooms are homogenous.
There is mixed evidence from the literature on peer eects, in particular with
respect to non-linearities. While some studies show that students from less favorable
social backgrounds and low achieving students are most aected by their peers (e.g.
Lavy et al., 2008; Schindler-Rangvid, 2003; Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer, 2007),
other authors did not nd any non-linearities (e.g. Ammerm uller and Pischke, 2006;
Hanushek et al., 2003). Carrell and Hoekstra (2008), on the other hand, found
that peers from troubled families strongly impair the cognitive achievement of high
income kids and the disciplinary behavior of low income kids.
To summarize the rationale: There are two channels how tracking might enhance
eciency, either through non-linear peer eects or through teacher eects. Both
channels suggest that tracking should occur as soon as possible. However, tracking
also comes at a cost: Ideally, track choice should be based on a student's innate
ability. Actually, a student's ability is unobserved and track choice is based on
an imperfect measure of ability, i.e. prior educational achievement (e.g. grades or
test scores). Psychologists argue that the correlation between childhood and adult
intelligence scores is low before 4th grade (Hopkins, 1990), and that at the age of 10
2cognitive skills are still developing (Petersen, 1983). Therefore, the cost of tracking
is the potential misallocation of students to tracks, and these cost are expected to
be higher, the earlier the track choice has to be made.3 Allen and Barnsley (1993)
argue that the misallocation eect stems from the "impossibility of observing ability
independent of maturity ..." (p. 649), resulting in achievement dierences that are
related to birth month.
Since school enrollment is always based on a certain cuto date, the birth month
of a student determines his or her position in the age distribution within a grade
or class. Recent research has shown that this position is related to a student's
achievement. For example, Bedard and Duhey (2006) show for a number of OECD
countries that younger students perform signicantly worse than their older peers in
4th and 8th grade.4 However, the estimated eect is a combination of an age-at-test
eect and a school-entry-age eect. Using IQ scores at the age of 18, Black et al.
(2008) are able to disentangle these eects and nd a strong positive age-at-test eect
and a small negative eect of starting school one year later. Elder and Lubotsky
(forthcoming) show that the age eect tends to be smaller in higher grades.
The main point of our paper is the following: If students are separated into dif-
ferent educational tracks very early, age-related achievement dierences probably
translate into age-related dierences in track choice | irrespective of the exact
origin of the age eect. Moreover, if age-related achievement dierences are less im-
portant in higher grades, early tracking may contribute to their persistence whereas
later selection could increase educational attainment and earnings.
We use register data from a major Austrian city for the period 1984 to 2006 to
study the secondary school track choice of Austrian students. We estimate whether
a student's observed age after 4th grade has any inuence on the track choice there-
after. We propose that relatively younger students are more likely to choose a low
track school instead of a high track school. Since observed age at track choice is
endogenous, we exploit the exogenous variation in birth month to identify the causal
age eect. After grade 8, students again have to make a track choice. We use ad-
ditional data from PISA 2003 and 2006 to analyze whether the eect is long-lasting
despite the possibility of track revision.
Related research has been done by J urges and Schneider (2007), Puhani and Weber
(2007) and Fertig and Kluve (2005) for Germany. J urges and Schneider (2007) use
data from the German PISA 2000 extension study and show that age at track choice
has a sizeable positive eect on the probability to attend a high track school in grades
3Brunello et al. (2007) describe this trade-o in a theoretical model and denote the counteracting
eects as \specialization" and \noise" eect.
4Similar results were obtained by McEwan and Shapiro (2008) for Chile.
35, 7 and 9. Puhani and Weber (2007) estimate age eects using register data for
the state of Hessen. They nd that students who are relatively young at school
entry are more likely to choose the low track in 5th grade, but this eect disappears
due to the possibility of track revision after 10th grade.5 Fertig and Kluve (2005)
use survey data and nd no signicant eect of enrollment age on track choice for
students enrolled in the late 1960s and 70s.
Our study adds to the literature in several ways. First, as we use register data for
18 cohorts we are able to look at the development of the age eect on track choice
over time. Second, we estimate the eect for boys and girls separately. Third, and
most importantly, we investigate whether the importance of age diminishes due to
the possibility of track revision after grade 8. Our results suggest that the age eect
is reinforced in a system of early tracking.
2 The Austrian education system
The Austrian education system is characterized by early tracking, a multitude of
dierent educational tracks and a strong vocational orientation. Figure 1 gives an
overview.
Primary school starts at the age of six and takes four years. School enrollment is
based on a cuto date, children are enrolled in a given year if they turn six before
September 1 of that year. Children turning six thereafter must delay enrollment by
one year. Since children may dier in maturity, these enrollment rules are not strictly
enforced, for example children who turn six between September 1 and December 31
may enroll early, if their parents apply for early enrollment, the health ocer of the
school conrms that the child is mature enough and the primary school principal
agrees (early enrollment). On the other hand, if it turns out that a six-year-old
child is not mature enough, he or she has to attend the pre-primary class instead
of the rst grade of primary school (late enrollment). Furthermore, if a student's
achievement is insucient in more than two subjects he or she has to repeat the
whole grade (grade retention).
After primary school, i.e. at the age of 10, students can choose between two types
of secondary education. Lower secondary (low track) schools comprise grades 5 to
8, provide basic general education and prepare students for vocational education
5However, the second result should be interpreted with caution because the estimations for
grades 11 to 13 are partly based on simulated observations. For grades 11 to 13, the authors
observe students who have chosen a high track school only. Therefore, they simulate the missing
observations and assign them to the low track. For these students they impute birth month,
enrollment age and all other individual characteristics based on the distributions of these variables
in the previous year.
4and training. Higher general (high track) schools comprise a rst stage (grades
5 to 8) and a second stage (grades 9 to 12), provide advanced general education
and conclude with a university entrance exam. These school types not only show







































Figure 1: The Austrian education system
Admission to a high track school requires grades of "very good" or "good" in the
core subjects of the primary school (German writing and reading, mathematics). If
these requirements are not met, students have to sit an admission exam. Apart from
that, track choice depends on parental choice and non-binding recommendations of
primary school teachers. In principle, there is the possibility to switch from the low
track to the high track, but depending on their performance, students may have to
pass an admission exam. Upward mobility is virtually non-existent, whereas some
downward mobility exists.
After grade 8, students again have the possibility to choose between dierent types
of schools: a pre-vocational school, a range of intermediate and higher vocational
schools or the second stage of a higher general school. Pre-vocational schools provide
the last year of compulsory schooling for those students who intend to pursue an ap-
prenticeship training. Intermediate vocational schools provide professional training
and conclude with a nal exam after three years. Higher vocational schools addi-
tionally provide advanced general education and university entrance qualications.
There are several types of intermediate and higher vocational schools with dierent
professional orientations (e.g. business, technical, tourism, teacher training).
5Although rst tracking occurs very early, the education system provides some
exibility by allowing students to revise their track decision after grade 8. For
example, students from low track schools have the possibility to go for a university
entrance qualication by choosing a higher vocational or higher general school (high
track) after grade 8. Depending on their grades, these students may have to pass
an exam to be admitted to a high track school in grade 9. However, the dierence
in the quality of education between high and low track schools through the grades 5
to 8 hampers the transition to a high track school in grade 9 for low track students.
The majority of Austrian students attends a low track school in grades 5-8, e.g.
in the school year 2006/07 about 67 percent of Austrian students attended a low
track school in grade 8 (Statistik Austria, 2008). Figure 2 shows the transition
of Austrian students after grade 8 separately for students attending high and low
track schools in grade 8. The school choices of high and low track students are very
dierent. While about 95% of high track students have chosen a track that provides
university entrance qualications, only about 35% of low track students changed to
an academic track in grade 9.
0 20 40 60 0 20 40 60
high track low track
dropout (pre)vocational higher vocational
interm vocational higher general
percent
Source: Statistik Austria, Schulstatistik 2008, Students grade 9 in 2006/07.
Figure 2: Transition of high- and low-track students after grade 8
3 Data
We analyze two sources of data: register data from the city of Linz, the third largest
city of Austria with about 190,000 inhabitants, and data from two PISA studies. The
register data cover all resident students who attended grade 5 in a public or a private
school in Linz in the school years 1984/85 to 2001/02.6 Students are observed until
6Our sample consists of 27 public schools and 6 private schools.
6grade 8.7 We observe some basic individual characteristics of the students (year and
month of birth, sex, language) and their school career (school type, school, grade).
In addition, we use survey data from the PISA studies 2003 and 2006, which cover a
sample of Austrian students who were born in the years 1987 and 1990, respectively.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our register data. Over the whole period,
about 45 percent of students attended a high track school in grade 5. Because some
students changed to a low track school, the percentage is somewhat lower in grade
8, indicating that downward mobility is greater than upward mobility. Girls were
somewhat more likely to attend a high track school than boys in all grades. About
81 percent of students enrolled regularly, 1 percent enrolled early and 18 percent
enrolled late.8 Boys were more likely to enroll late, whereas girls were more likely
to enroll early. Boys were also more likely to repeat a grade, both in primary school
as well as in the rst stage of secondary education (grades 5-8).
Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean (%)
Variable All Girls Boys
High track (grade 5) 44.8 45.8 43.9
High track (grade 8) 41.4 42.9 39.8
Enrollment
Regular 80.9 83.6 78.2
Late 18.0 14.9 20.9
Early 1.2 1.5 0.9
Repeated grade (grades 2-4) 3.6 3.1 4.0
Repeated grade (grades 5-8) 5.7 4.8 6.7
Immigrant background 5.2 5.1 5.2
N 25,232 12,469 12,763
Notes: The sample consists of students observed in grade 5 between 1984-
2001. We observe the same students until they reach grade 8.
As shown in Figure 3, the share of students who enrolled late was highest among
students born in August, i.e. children born closely before the cuto date (1st Septem-
ber). On the other hand, early enrollment is only an issue for children born closely
after the cuto date.
7Actually, our data also includes grade 9 students, but only those who have not repeated a
grade or attended a pre-primary class. This is because the single purpose of the data collection is
to report 9 years of compulsory schooling.
8Note that late enrollment means that children attend the pre-primary class of the primary
























Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
regular enrollment late enrollment
early enrollment
Figure 3: Regular, late and early enrollment by birth month
4 Estimation strategy
In a rst step, we estimate whether observed age after 4th grade has any inuence
on the track choice thereafter. We begin with a simple model:
High track

ig = 1g + 2g Observed agei + 3g Xi + ig
High trackig =
(





ig is the latent probability of student i to attend a high track
school in grade g = f5;6;7;8g, Observed agei is the observed age of student i after
4th grade (measured in years), Xi is a vector of student characteristics and ig is
the error term. We use observed age after grade 4 in each grade-level estimation
because the track choice is actually made after grade 4 and not after each grade.
Variation in observed age arises from the following two sources: First, the dis-
tribution of births over the calendar year, and second, the non-compliance of some
students to the school enrollment cuto date. As our data suggest, some students
enroll early and thus, are among the youngest within grade, whereas students who
enroll late or repeat a grade in primary school are among the oldest within grade.
Since we cannot assume that the reasons for irregular enrollment and grade reten-
tion are exogenous with respect to track choice, a simple probit model will give us a
biased estimate of the age eect. The estimate is expected to be downward-biased if
children who defer enrollment or repeat a grade tend to be negatively selected with
8respect to cognitive and non-cognitive skills, whereas children who start school early
tend to be particularly skilled.
To identify the causal age eect, we only use the exogenous variation in observed
age at track choice coming from the variation in birth month and the school enroll-
ment cuto date; i.e. we use the expected age at track choice as an instrument for
the observed age at track choice. The expected age is the age a student should have
if he or she had not deferred enrollment, started school early or repeated a grade.
The rst stage equation for observed age at track choice is the following:
Observed agei = 1g + 2g Expected agei + 3g Xi + uig
where Expected agei is equal to 0 for students born in August and equal to 1 for
students born in September. The dierence in expected age between August-born
and September-born students corresponds to 11 months. The relationship between




11 if 1  bi  8
20 bi
11 if 9  bi  12
where bi is the birth month of student i.
The identication of the causal eect of age at track choice is based on two as-
sumptions. First, our instrument must be randomly assigned. This assumption
requires that a student's birth month is random and not related to e.g. cognitive or
non-cognitive skills or parental background. At least, we must assume that parents
do not schedule births to fall either before or after the cuto date. If, for example,
high-ability parents are more likely to have their children in September than in Au-
gust, because then they are among the oldest within grade, the estimated age eect
would be upward-biased. Second, the instrument must not have any other direct
eect on track choice. Since the register data does not provide us with any parental
characteristics, we cannot check whether August-born and September-born students
are dierent in characteristics that may aect track choice. However, we are con-
dent that birth month is a valid instrument because the need for birth timing is
less obvious in a system where the cuto date rule is not strictly enforced (late and
early enrollment is possible).9 As a robustness check, we include quarter of birth
in our regressions and show results for a regression discontinuity sample including
only students born in August and September. In the PISA sample we control for an
index of parental socioeconomic status and highest parental education.
9A birth month histogram for our sample of students shows that the distribution of birth months
is relatively even, particulary for the birth months around the cuto date.
9We interpret our results in a local average treatment eect (LATE) framework
(Angrist et al., 1996), implying that we estimate the causal age eect for compliers,
i.e. for students who complied with the cuto date rule and did not repeat a grade
in primary school. As we have shown in Table 1 and Figure 3, this group is sizeable
and should be relevant for policymakers.
Figure 4 presents the relationship between expected age (solid line) and observed
age (dashed line) at track choice. The solid line shows that students born in August
should be 10 years old when making their track choice, whereas students born in
September should be 11 months older. The deviation of observed age from expected
age is due to non-compliance with the cuto date rule and grade retention in pri-
mary school. As expected, the highest deviation is found for students born closely
before the cuto date. These students are more likely to enroll late and to repeat
a grade. Nevertheless, there is still a clear discontinuity in observed age at track
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Figure 4: Birth month, expected age and observed age at track choice
From a policy point of view, we are also interested in the reduced-form relationship
between expected age and track choice, which can be interpreted as the eect of the
cuto date rule net of grade retention in primary school and late/early enrollment
(intention-to-treat eect). The model can be written as:
High track

ig = 2g + 1g Expected agei + 3g Xi + ig
Figure 5 shows the intention-to-treat eect with birth month instead of expected
age at the x-axis. Even though August-born students are more likely to enroll late
10and to repeat a grade, which increases their age at track choice, those students are
























































Figure 5: The reduced-form relationship between birth month and track choice
5 Results
5.1 Track choice in grades 5{8
In Table 2 we present our estimates of the eect of age at track choice on the
probability to attend a high track school in grades 5 to 8. The table shows results
from IV-Probit, rst-stage, reduced-form and probit estimations for each grade.
As the rst-stage estimate and the F-statistics show, expected age seems to be a
good instrument, in the sense that it is suciently correlated with observed age
at track choice. The IV estimate suggests that being 11 months older at track
choice increases a student's probability to attend a high track school in grade 5 by
17.5 percentage points, which is a substantial eect given that on average about 45
percent of students attend a high track school in grade 5. Table 2 also reports the
results for grades 6{8 to show how the causal eect of age at track choice evolves
over grades. We would expect the eect to diminish over grades if small dierences
in age become less and less important as the school career progresses. For grade 8,
the point estimate is somewhat smaller (15.4 percentage points), but the dierence is
not signicant. We conclude that the Austrian school system has no\self-correcting
mechanism"between grades 5{8 that leads to a correct allocation of talents.
The reduced-form estimate shows the net impact of the cuto date rule on track
choice. An age dierence of 11 months, i.e. being born in September instead of
11Table 2: Results for track choice in grades 5{8
Grade 5 6 7 8
IV-Probit 0.175*** 0.165*** 0.160*** 0.154***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Reduced-form 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.065***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
First-stage 0.424*** 0.424*** 0.424*** 0.424***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Probit -0.237*** -0.241*** -0.240*** -0.238***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
F-statistic (rst-stage) 147.3 140.5 140.5 140.1
Observations 25,232 25,232 25,232 25,232
Notes: The sample consists of students observed in grade 5 between 1984-2001. Note that
the same students are observed in grades 6{8. Robust standard error in parentheses. ***, **
and * indicate signicance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level. Control variables
are: gender, immigrant background and year dummies.
August, leads to a 7.7 (6.5) percentage points dierence in the probability to attend
a high track school in grade 5 (8). The reduced-form estimates are lower because
non-compliance partly osets the disadvantage created by the education system
for children born closely before the cuto date; for example delaying enrollment
by one year and attending a pre-primary class instead may help those students to
compensate for their initial disadvantage.
As expected, the estimated parameters from a probit model of observed age on
track choice are downward-biased. Actually, the estimates are even negative, sug-
gesting that students who are older because they enrolled late or repeated a grade
in primary school are negatively selected with respect to cognitive skills.
We perform two sensitivity tests to show that we are not confounding the causal
eect of age with season of birth eects. Recent research suggests that season of
birth might be correlated with family background. Buckles and Hungerman (2008)
nd for the U.S. that children born in the rst quarter are more likely to have a less
favorable family background. To meet these concerns, table 3 presents results for a
regression discontinuity sample and from regressions with quarter of birth dummies
as additional control variables. The regression discontinuity sample includes only
students born in August and September, i.e. students born closely before and after
the cuto date. The estimated eect in the RD sample is very similar to the eect
12in the sample including all birth months. Furthermore, including quarter of birth
dummies does not signicantly change our estimates.
Table 3: Sensitivity checks
RD sample + Quarter of birth
Grade 5 8 5 8
IV-Probit 0.196*** 0.169*** 0.154*** 0.126***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.031) (0.032)
Reduced-form 0.065*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.047***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
First-stage 0.309*** 0.309*** 0.380*** 0.380***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
F-statistic (rst stage) 31.42 30.02 162.9 155.8
Observations 4,260 4,260 25,232 25,232
Notes: The regressions discontinuity sample only includes students born in August or
September. The sample consists of students observed in grade 5 between 1984-2001. Note
that the same students are observed in grades 6{8. Robust standard error in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level. Control
variables are: gender, immigrant background and school year dummies.
Table 4 presents separate estimations for girls (panel A) and boys (panel B).
Compliance is signicantly lower for boys than for girls. The IV and reduced-form
estimates show that girls suer more from being relatively young than boys.10 The
net impact of expected age on the probability to attend a high track school in grade
5 is 9.9 percentage points for girls and 5.6 percentage points for boys. Apparently,
the compensation mechanism is more eective for boys than for girls. The estimates
of the causal eect of age at track choice suggest that being 11 months younger at
track choice decreases the probability to choose the high track by 19.4 percentage
points for girls and 15 percentage points for boys. This nding may be due to
gender dierences in the composition of compliers reected by the higher rate of
non-compliance for boys, particularly for those born in August. It could be that,
at the age of six, boys appear to be less mature than girls because they look less
mature, and therefore, are more likely to be enrolled late. In fact, there is evidence
in the psychology literature that the psychological and cognitive development of
girls and boys is similar until the age of 10 to 12 and diverges thereafter (Petersen,
1988).11
10Reduced-form estimates from linear probability models are similar to the probit models and
show that the eect is signicantly higher for girls.
11Pekkarinen (2008) shows that the Finnish comprehensive school reform led to an increase in
gender dierences in the probability of choosing a high track secondary school because of gender
dierences in the timing of puberty.
13Table 4: Results for track choice in grades 5{8 by gender
Grade 5 6 7 8
Panel A: Girls
IV-Probit 0.194*** 0.178*** 0.172*** 0.164***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Reduced-form 0.099*** 0.089*** 0.085*** 0.080***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
First-stage 0.484*** 0.484*** 0.484*** 0.484***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
F-statistic (rst-stage) 90.37 85.91 86.21 85.82
Observations 12,469 12,469 12,469 12,469
Panel B: Boys
IV-Probit 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.144*** 0.140***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Reduced-form 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.049***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
First-stage 0.365*** 0.365*** 0.365*** 0.365***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
F-statistic (rst-stage) 55.11 52.50 52.43 52.36
Observations 12,763 12,763 12,763 12,763
Notes: Both samples consists of students observed in grade 5 between 1984-2001. Note that
the same students are observed in grades 6{8. Robust standard error in parentheses. ***, **
and * indicate signicance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level. Control variables
are: immigrant background and school year dummies.
Since our data cover a fairly long period we are able to analyze whether the
importance of age at track choice is only a recent phenomenon. Figure 6 shows the
development of the estimated eects over time.12 Each estimate is based on data
covering a 3-year-period. The result is clear-cut: Both, the causal eect of age at
track choice and the eect of expected age have been relatively stable over the period
1984{2004. The estimates for the causal eect range between 12 and 20 percentage
points, and the reduced-form estimates are between 5 and 9 percentage points.
5.2 Track choice in grade 9
Between grades 5 to 8 upward mobility is virtually non-existent, whereas downward
mobility is possible. If students perform poorly in the high track they can change
to the low track without any formal requirements. In fact, upward mobility is only
common after grade 8, where students again have to choose between dierent school
12These estimates come from a slightly dierent sample which covers the period 1984{2004 and
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Figure 6: Development of the age eect over time (grade 5)
tracks. In a sense, the education system provides a mechanism that could lead to
a correct allocation of talents. We would expect that the age eect disappears if
students, who ended up in the low track because they were young at track choice,
can compensate for their initial disadvantage and are more likely to change to the
high track than their older peers.
We use survey data from the PISA studies 2003 and 2006 to test whether there
is such a \self-correcting mechanism" after grade 8.13 PISA does not sample whole
grades, but students born in a certain year, i.e. birth cohorts 1987 and 1990 for PISA
2003 and 2006, respectively. Due to birth cohort sampling, students are observed in
grade 9 or 10 depending on their birth month and their compliance to the cuto date
rule. Questions on the school career of those students allow us to reconstruct the
attended school track in grade 8 and 9, as well as the observed age at track choice
(after grade 4 and 8). Our estimation sample consists of all students observed in
grade 9 and 10 for which we can reconstruct these variables.14 Since PISA only
samples students in educational programmes, we do not observe a small fraction of
grade 10 students, i.e. those who dropped out after grade 9. If drop outs are more
likely to come from the low track, we underestimate the true causal eect.
Table 5 presents the results for track choice in grade 9. We estimate two dier-
ent specications: The base specication controls for gender, immigrant background
13The register data do not cover the transition after grade 8 for students who have repeated a
grade or attended a pre-primary class. We cannot use these data to investigate grade 9 because
whether we observe a student in grade 9 is correlated with age and birth month.
14 For about 10 percent of students we do not have information on the school career because of
missing values in these variables. Table 7 in the appendix shows the share of students in low and
high track schools and the transition after grade 8 for our estimation sample. The numbers are in
line with ocial numbers from the federal bureau of statistics presented in the introduction.
15and the pisa wave, whereas in the SES specication we add an index of of parental
socioeconomic status and parents' highest education level measured in ISCED cat-
egories.
In the rst two columns, the estimates are based on the whole sample of Austrian
students. Our estimates show that the probability to attend a high track school
in grade 9 is 10.6 percentage points higher for students being 11 months older at
track choice after grade 8. To make the estimate comparable to those for Linz,
we presents results from separate regressions for schools located in urban and rural
areas in columns (3){(6). We nd no eect for students who attend schools in
rural areas, whereas the eect for students attending schools in urban areas is quite
high and suggests that the second tracking after grade 8 does not oset the initial
disadvantage of relatively younger students.
Table 5: Results for track choice in grade 9
All areas Urban areas Rural areas
Base + SES Base + SES Base + SES
IV-Probit 0.106* 0.125** 0.281*** 0.283*** -0.043 -0.014
(0.055) (0.054) (0.066) (0.065) (0.084) (0.084)
Reduced form 0.047* 0.055** 0.119*** 0.120*** -0.021 -0.008
(0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.040) (0.040)
First stage 0.430*** 0.429*** 0.388*** 0.389*** 0.482*** 0.480***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
F-statistic (FS) 162.9 77.44 95.38 43.13 122.5 60.28
Observations 7,114 7,114 3,912 3,912 3,202 3,202
% high track 60% 60% 67% 67% 52% 52%
Mean SES 49.32 49.32 51.39 51.39 46.79 46.79
St.Dev. SES 0.35 0.35 0.46 0.46 0.53 0.53
Notes: Data from PISA 2003 and 2006. Standard error (in parentheses) account for complex survey design.
***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level. Control variables are:
gender, immigrant background and a pisa wave dummy in the base specication and additionally an index of
parental socioeconomic status (SES) and parents' highest education level (ISCED) in the SES specication.
The urban (rural) sample includes only students whose school is located in a city with more (less) than
15.000 inhabitants.
We further investigate this hypothesis by estimating regressions for track choice in
grade 8 in urban and rural areas separately. The results are presented in Table 6. We
nd that the age eect does not change between grade 8 and grade 9 and conclude
that upward mobility of low track students does not lead to a correct allocation of
talents in urban areas.
While there is some concern that we misclassify some of the students because we
only know the location of the school a student attended in grade 9 and not whether
16the student lives in a rural or urban area, we are condent that these classication
errors cannot explain the magnitude of our estimates. Our results would be biased
if older rural students are more likely to change to high track schools in urban areas
than younger rural students. We nd no evidence for this hypothesis since the
distributions of students across birth months for the urban and the rural sample do
not indicate that there is a higher proportion of older students in the urban sample.
Table 6: Results for track choice in grade 8
All areas Urban areas Rural areas
Base + SES Base + SES Base + SES
IV-Probit 0.123*** 0.140*** 0.271*** 0.278*** 0.007 0.027
(0.044) (0.044) (0.062) (0.064) (0.049) (0.043)
Reduced form 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.114*** 0.117*** 0.004 0.013
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024) (0.021)
First stage 0.442*** 0.441*** 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.495*** 0.492***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
F-statistic (FS) 172.9 82.26 100.9 45.35 129.5 64.79
Observations 7,114 7,114 3,912 3,912 3,202 3,202
% high track 31% 31% 42% 42% 18% 18%
Mean SES 49.32 49.32 51.39 51.39 46.79 46.79
St.Dev. SES 0.35 0.35 0.46 0.46 0.53 0.53
Notes: Data from PISA 2003 and 2006. Standard error (in parentheses) account for complex survey design.
***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level. Control variables are:
gender, immigrant background and a pisa wave dummy in the base specication and additionally an index of
parental socioeconomic status (SES) and parents' highest education level (ISCED) in the SES specication.
The urban (rural) sample includes only students whose school is located in a city with more (less) than
15.000 inhabitants.
What are the reasons for the dierence in the age eect between urban and rural
areas? We argue that rural low track schools are similar to comprehensive schools
since the majority of students (about 80 percent) from rural areas attends the local
low track school until grade 8. Actually, rst tracking occurs later in rural areas.
In contrast, in urban areas, where almost 50 percent of all students attend a high
track school until grade 8, early tracking leads to a persistent age eect.
One may object that comprehensive schools are more ecient only in rural areas
because students are more homogenous there. In fact, we nd the opposite pattern;
the standard deviation of the index of parental socioeconomic status is higher for
students in rural than in urban areas (see Table 6).
176 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the secondary school track choice of Austrian students. We
argue that, in education systems where rst tracking occurs very early, track choice
is strongly inuenced by factors other than innate ability and provide evidence that
age at track choice is one such factor. Our estimation results show that relatively
younger students are 15{18 percentage points less likely to choose a high track school
in grades 5{8, and that the importance of age at track choice has been stable over
the last 20 years. Moreover, there are gender dierences in the age eect, with
girls suering more from being relatively young. We also look beyond grade 8,
where students again have to make a track choice and nd that the eect does not
disappear. Apparently, the education system fails to provide a mechanism that leads
to an ecient allocation of students to tracks.
We nd signicant dierences between students in rural and urban areas. Since
high track schools are mainly located in urban areas, most students from rural areas
attend the local low track school until grade 8. For this reason, rural low track
schools are similar to comprehensive schools and actual tracking occurs later. There
is no age eect in rural areas in grade 8 or 9, suggesting that the eect is only
long-lasting if students are tracked early. Thus, later selection of students could
contribute to an increase in educational attainment.
18A Appendix
Table 7: Transition of students after grade 8
All By school type in grade 8
School type in grade 9 High track Low track
Higher general 0.23 0.58 0.07
Higher vocational 0.37 0.38 0.37
Intermediate vocational 0.15 0.02 0.21
(Pre-)Vocational 0.24 0.01 0.35
High track 0.60 0.97 0.44
Low track 0.40 0.03 0.56
Share of students 0.31 0.69
Mean SES 49.32 58.42 45.23
St.Dev. SES 0.35 0.46 0.32
Observations 7,114 2,191 4,923
Notes: Data from PISA 2003 and 2006.
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